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NOTE-AN INTERESTING DECISION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TRADEMARKS*
UGO DRAETTA**

B Y a decision dated February

7, 1969, the Tribunal of Milan
has resolved a dispute between the Italian company, Columbia
Nastri & Carta Carbone S.p.A., plaintiff, and the American company, Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Manufacturing Co. Inc., defendant, establishing some very interesting-and partially newprinciples on the international status of trademarks.' The various grounds for the decision of the Milan Court, however, are
not equally convincing and deserve careful scrutiny.
The judgment granted all the requests of the American company, completely rejecting the requests of the plaintiff.2 At the
outset, the judge rejected two preliminary procedural exceptions
of the Italian company, which are of no importance to this commentary. Then passing to the merits, the Tribunal decided that
title to the trademarks belonged to the American company.3
The arguments of the Tribunal of Milan are based on the
assumption that the applicable law is the law of the State of New

York:
In fact .

.

. for the purpose of determining the applicable law it is

necessary to make reference to art. 25 of the preleggi [preliminary

rules to the Civil Code4], according to which the obligations arising
from an agreement are governed by the national law of the contract-

ing parties, if it is common between them, and otherwise by the law of
the place where the agreement was concluded. From all the documentation produced (particularly the agreements of 1949 and 1955), it

results that all the agreements between the parties were concluded in
New York, since said agreements were perfected when the American
company, which made the proposal and which was domiciled in New
*This is a companion piece to Ebb, Current Problems of American Companies that
Permit Use of Their Corporate Names and Trademarks Overseas, page 147 of this issue.
0* Professor of International Law, Catholic University of Milan, Italy. LL.B.. University of Naples, 1960.
1. Columbia Nastri 8- Carta Carbone S.p.A. v. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co.,
I1 Foro Padano, 1969, I. 931, Tribunal of Milan, March 17, 1969. See Ebb, pp. 155-58
supra for the facts of this case and a commentary on the former litigation involved.

2. Columbia Nastri & Carta Carbone S.p.A. v. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co.,
11 Foro Padano, 1969, 1. 931, Tribunal of Milan, March 17, 1969.
3. Id.
4. C. Civ. (Disposizionisulla Legge in generale art. 25 Para. 1) (Hoepli 1965).
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York, received in New York knowledge of the acceptance by the other
party (art. 1326 of the Civil Code). Nor is art. 31 of the preleggi
applicable to this case (prohibition against declaring applicable to the
territory of the Republic of Italy foreign rules that are contrary to
public policy), since the subject of the present litigation consists of

conflicting claims to title of trademarks by the two parties in controversy; the trademarks constitute diritti reali (that is, "real" rights,
as opposed to rights derived from obligations) and as to them
no limiting rule of public policy exists.5

There are many weak points in this approach. First of all,
the Tribunal is forgetting that it is now clear that an agreement
concerning intangible interests is subject to the national law indicated on the basis of article 25 of the preleggi (law of the parties
or place of conclusion of the agreement) only to determine questions concerning the obligations between the parties. All other
questions, regarding the validity, title and extent of industrial
property rights remain subject to the law specifically governing
these rights." Both the traditional approach based on article 22 of
the preleggi7 (lex loci rei sitae) and an approach based on the
principle of territoriality of the intangible property rights, 8 indicate that Italian law should govern Italian intangible interests.
In the case under consideration, the Tribunal expressly
stated that the problem was one of resolving a dispute concerning
title to trademarks. By classifying the trademarks as diritti reali
("real" rights), it accepted the opinion of the majority of the
writers who have dealt with the dispute over the nature of intangible property. Under these circumstances it seems very difficult,
to escape the lex loci rei sitae (the law of the place where the
goods are situated) and thus the Italian law. The reference which
the judge made to article 1326 of the Civil Code for the purpose
5. Columbia Nastri & Carta Carbone S.p.A. v. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co.,
II Foro Padano, 1969, I. 931, Tribunal of Milan, March 17, 1969.
6.
H. BATIFFOL, TRArri tL EMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV 579 (1959).
7. C. Civ. (Disposizionisulla Legge in generate art. 22) (Hoepli 1965). This article
states:
Possession, property and other rights on mobile or fixed things are governed by the
law of the places where such things are situated.
8. On the law governing intangible rights see U. DRAETrA, IL REGIME INTERNAZIONALE
DELLA PROPRIETA INDUsTRIALE 31 (1967) and the doctrine contained therein; on the specific

problem of the law governing agreements concerning immaterial goods see TROLLER, DAS
INTERNATIONALE PATENT-UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHT iu,

GEWERBLICHEN RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URtIE-

BERPECHT (1960), and Draetta, Conflitti di legge in materia di contratti di licenza brevettuale, 118 DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE 279 (1964).
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of determining the place of conclusion of the agreement, is also
not very well based, even though his view follows previous authorityY The reasons for the doubts lie in the fact that article
1326 contemplates the moment and not the place of conclusion of
the agreement, and that the rule seems to refer to agreements
concluded by an offer followed by a separate acceptance, rather
than to agreements which are normally defined during negotiations and then formalized into a text bearing the signature of the
two parties. Thus, even if Italian law did not govern the case for
the reasons argued above, the court has not given good reasons for
not finding that the agreement was concluded in Italy, and therefore that Italian law should govern.
The exclusion of any public policy implication is hardly
convincing or at least not sufficiently substantiated by the court's
reasoning. The mere fact that trademarks constitute real rights
certainly does not exclude per se the possible existence of public
policy limitations.
Comment on the merit of the judgment under consideration
could be exhausted with the observation that the judge applied
the law of the State of New York, when he should have applied
the Italian law; consequently it is impossible to know the conclusions which he might have reached by applying the law of Italy.
Even so it would have been interesting to examine the reasoning
of the judge based on the law of the State of New York, to compare it with that of the American judges, whose judgment the
Tribunal of Milan refused to recognize and enforce. But the only
reference to American law which we can find in the decision is
the following:
In other words, even if the Register of the Central Patent Office establishes that the Italian company owns the trademarks, it is however
neither contrary to the law of the State of New York, governing in the
matter for the above mentioned reasons, nor contrary to Italian

public policy, to determine that a valid relation of a trusteeship
nature existed between the parties, pursuant to which the Italian company appeared externally as the owner of the trademarks, while, with
respect to the internal relationships between the parties, the trade9. See Iaccarino, Questioni in tema di "Delibazione", 20 DIrrTO INTERNAZIONALE 97
(1966). See also Draetta, Orientamenti Giurisprudenziali sul luogo di conclusione del
contratto,21 DiRrrro INTERNAZIONALE 77 (1967).
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marks belonged in fact to the American company, which authorized
the Italian company to register them in the name of the latter.' 0

It does not seem to us to be enough to state that all that "is not
contrary to the law of the State of New York;" in our opinion the
Italian judge should have examined New York law much more
closely to see how it would apply to the case under consideration.
It is true that the two American judgments exist on the matter,
but it is also true that the picture of American case law on the
matter appears rather complex and deserving of deeper examination. 1
The paragraph which concluded this part of the decision is
worthy of particular attention, since it reveals the confusion of
ideas into which the Tribunal seems to have fallen: "The reality
of trademark law does not exclude, on the contrary, the fact that
the true owner is different from the apparent owner is indicated by
the title on the public register."'1 2 Here it is not said to which
law reference is made, whether to the American or to the Italian
law, though perhaps we have to assume that the judge meant to
refer to the American law. On a general basis, however, the judge
confused the intellectual creation consisting of the name "Columbia" and the intangible property right consisting of the
Italian trademark COLUMBIA. They are two distinct entities,
likely to belong to different owners, and to circulate separately.
One of them, the intellectual creation that has not yet become
via registration an intangible property right, is unique all over
the world. It has no territory because it is universal, and its creator
has a right of authorship with respect to it which cannot be disposed of, like the right of the personality. The other, the intangi.
ble interest, is a legal interest of economic content, of the same
nature as the "real" right, having a territorial character, recognized by a given state through a public deed, i.e. the registration.
That right can belong to a person different from the author of the
intellectual creation; it is possible that many distinct owners
exist for the trademark COLUMBIA registered in the various
countries. 3 Consequently the existence of a "true" owner of a
10. Columbia Nastri & Carta Carbone S.p.A. v. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg.
Co., II Foro Padano, 1969, I. 931, 933, Tribunal of Milan, March 17, 1969.
11. See Ebb, supra note 1.
12. Columbia Nastri & Carta Carbone S.p.A. v. Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co.,
I1Foro Padano, 1969, I. 931, 933. Tribunal of Milan, March 17, 1969.
13. U. DRAETTA, IL. REGIME INTERNAZIONALE DELLA PROPRIETA INDUSTRIALL (1967).
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trademark, as opposed to the "apparent" owner resulting from the
public register, is not conceivable. Whoever is the registered
owner of the trademark on the public register is the true owner of
the trademark as an intangible interest. The owner of the intellectual creation may be different, but its right has no economic
content.
Thus, there are many aspects of the court's decision which
can be criticized. It is hard to conceal the belief that the judge was
convinced that, on an equitable basis, the arguments of the defendant were well founded, and tried to marshall legal support for
said arguments. An alternative way existed, however, for discerning legal grounds for the acceptance of the major part of the
arguments of the American company, without making all the
aforementioned mistakes, and in particular without having to conclude that the Italian company had no title to the trademarks.
When, in 1934, -the Italian company registered the trademarks in its own name it certainly acquired title to them. The
acquisition, however, was based on a non-written agreement in
which the American company committed itself: (a) to let the trademarks filed by it in 1924 elapse; (b) not to assert its 1924
trademarks in opposition to prevent the registration of the 1934
trademarks by the Italian company; and (c) to allow the Italian
company to continue using the company name "Columbia"
(which obviously was an intangible interest different from the
trademark COLUMBIA) which name never ceased to belong to
the American company. This contractual relationship did not
need, at that time, to be embodied in writing because the Italian
company was then controlled by the American company. It was
rendered explicit when, in 1949, the American Columbia lost such
control and the compensation agreed upon at that time was in fact
the compensation for the contractual obligations mentioned in
points (a), (b) and (c) above.
When the relationships between the two companies became
critical in 1959, from the legal point of view the situation appeared as follows: The Italian company was the owner of certain
trademarks, and the title was acquired as an original act (i.e. not
as a consequence of a transfer or an assignment) though the
acquisition of such title was made possible only as a consequence
of certain non-contested undertakings on the part of the American company. The opinion that there was a transfer of trade-
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marks from the American company with a consequent obligation
to give them back is not convincing, both because there was
no transfer in the proper sense-as we have seen-and because the
defendant never advanced a claim for getting back these trademarks, not even when, in the years from 1946 to 1949, the
nationalistic climate no longer existed in Italy and the American
company still controlled the Italian company. The Italian company was using a company name owned-beyond any doubt-by
the American company. 1 4 As compensation for the above, the
Italian company committed itself to pay to the American company
a certain sum in given installments over the years.
At a given point the Italian company did not fulfill its commitments, since it refused to make the agreed upon payments.
Consequently, the defendant very properly asked for the termination of the agreement by default of the plaintiff. But what were
the consequences of such termination? Since the agreement was of
a continued implementation type, the consequences, of course, in
no way extended to the obligations already fulfilled. 1 First of
all the Italian company had to lose its right to include the name
"Columbia" in its company name, and consequently had to be
required to modify said name. Accordingly, the Milan judge was
right in so deciding.
What was then the nature of the trademarks? The Tribunal
decided that they must be considered as registered in the name
of the American company and ordered its decision to be transmitted to the Central Patent Office for change of the registration.
In so deciding, the Tribunal went even further than the requests
of the defendant, which had asked for the transfer of the trademarks and thereby implied it deemed the ownership of the trademarks legally belonged to the Italian company at the time of the
request. It would have certainly been preferable if the Tribunal
had simply limited itself to accepting the requests of the defendant; but it would have been more correct to decide as follows.
14. As to this point, articles 13 and 14 of the Italian Trademark Law would likely
confer on the Italian company in its capacity as owner of the trademark COLUMBIA, the
ownership of the company name "Columbia." TRADEMARK LAW art. 13-14 (No. 924, June
21, 1942). However, Article 8 of the 1883 Paris Convention would prevent such a result.
1883 International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, June 6, 1884,
art. VIII, 25 Stat. 1372, 76 (1887) states:
The commercial name shall be protected in all the countries of the Union without
obligation of deposit, whether it forms part or not, of a trade or commercial mark.
15. C. Civ. art. 1458 (Hoepli 1965).
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The trademarks in question belonged to the Italian company.
These trademarks, however, were obtained thanks to a given
course of conduct which the American company committed itself
to undertake. Such commitment no longer bound the American
company as a consequence of the non-performance by the Italian
company. Consequently, the American company was entitled to
enforce all its rights concerning the name "Columbia" owned by
it, including the exclusive right, deriving from article 13 of the
Trademark Law, to register such name as trademark.:' Therefore
the American company was entitled to ask for the cancellation of
the trademarks (only those based on the word "Columbia") registered by the Italian company, which no longer had any right to
the name "Columbia"; the American company could then proceed to new registrations of these trademarks in its own name, if
it were not possible to revive those of 1924.
So deciding, the Tribunal would have substantially accepted
the arguments of the American company, which on an equitable
basis appear better founded than those of the Italian company,
without having had to make the errors in legal doctrine which are
contained in its decision.
16. TRADEMARK LAxv art. 13 para. 2 (No. 924, June 21, 1942) states:
Those who have the right to a tradename have also the exclusive right to use it as a
trademark for their business activities or commerce.

